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Stiehm: Military Education: Past, Present, and Future,

The author’s attempt to weave a
straight course through the warfare of
three ethnicities suffers from a few
shortcomings. As the author seeks to
produce history, there is a great deal of
personal recollection. If the author is
attempting an autobiography, there is a
great deal of history. Some might say
his own ethnic identity prevents a balanced account of Serb or Croatian media. Kurspahic understands this; his
damning indictment of his own country’s media and how Bosnian nationalism translated into violence speaks for
itself. Nevertheless, the author also accepts the necessity to play the ethnic
card and laments that Oslobodjenje’s
“selected editing” in Sarajevo was necessary for its survival.
Concluding with the current changes in
the Balkan media and a list of future
policy options to prevent media nationalism, Kurspahic returns to the optimistic tone of the beginning of the
work. Reviewing the policy recommendations of the last chapter, Kurspahic
yearns for a free and independent press,
one worthy of, and desiring, outside critique. The author would also welcome a
press that challenges the government.
This optimism, though warranted, may
be premature. It remains to be seen if
international media-watchdog groups
can bring about any of these changes.
Prime Time Crime commands an important place on the bookshelf of anyone studying the former Yugoslavia.
Kemal Kurspahic trains an unblinking
eye on the nationalist Balkan press and
its contribution to the war. In particular, the first chapter and the appendices
should be required reading for any officer posted to duty in this troubled region. Although addressing just one
small piece of the puzzle that was the
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fall of Yugoslavia, Kurspahic’s narrative
of the rise of a nationalist press answers
many questions about the society of
former Yugoslavia, its destruction, and
its ability to prosecute such a horrendous conflict. In a much broader sense,
Prime Time Crime reveals what may happen when any government, political
leader, or nationalist ideal captures or
co-opts the media.
CLEMSON G. TURREGANO

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College

Kennedy, Gregory C., and Keith Neilson, eds.
Military Education: Past, Present, and Future.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002. 256pp. $64.99

This collection of ten essays is largely
historical. Only three deal with current
military education, and none focuses
substantially on the future. Six examine
European institutions, while three address military education in the United
States and one recent change in Canada. The editors and authors are seasoned historians; some teach at civilian
institutions, some at military schools.
The essays report the continuing tension between academic officerpreparation and hands-on experience,
and the contrast of both approaches
with the military’s more usual method
of preparation—training. All agree that
technology and its continued development mean education is required. History
is agreed to be crucial to military education, but there are critiques here of how it
is used and of its tendency to direct
attention to the past rather than to consider the past’s meaning for the future.
T. G. Otte discusses the influence of
the French Revolution and German
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philosophy on von Clausewitz’s discussion of the development and value of
leaders with “genius.” Dennis E.
Showalter describes the evolution of
Prussian military education in the direction of merit criteria for officer selection and the resulting increase in the
number of officers who were commoners. Lori Bogle of the U.S. Naval Academy then addresses how Prussian
lessons were applied at the Military
Academy at West Point by Sylvanus
Thayer, superintendent from 1817 to
1833. She describes his emphasis on
moral education, which included religious revivals and rigorous mental and
physical discipline. Equality, honor,
competition, and formal training in
ethics were all part of Thayer’s efforts to
tame what Bogle calls “boy culture” and
its individualistic definition of personal
honor—characteristic of the antebellum American South—in terms that entailed military obedience.
Several essays consider British military
education. Andrew Lambert notes that
militaries believe experience is crucial,
but in fact many officers do not actually
have experience, so academics are important. Academics, he says, should
stimulate real thinking, but too often
that comes only after military defeat.
Further, the “edge” provided by critical
thinking is too often of short duration.
Lambert argues that selection for intellectual prowess and assignments to
posts that use prowess is all-important
and that poor leadership leads to setbacks. One example of poor leadership,
he says, was that of First Lord Winston
Churchill, “who would not listen to advice.” David French discusses officer
training in the regular British army between the two world wars. A not entirely successful effort was made to
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broaden the social class of officers,
broaden their education, expand their
view beyond that of the regiment, recruit officers with university degrees,
and promote by examination as opposed to primarily by seniority. A
weakness of officer education that appeared in the early years of World War
II was its lack of training in “all-arms
cooperation.”
Mark R. Grandstaff gets to tell the story
of the founding of the U.S. Air War
College in the heady days of the newly
created service after World War II. Its
motto? “Unhampered by Tradition”; its
education was to be “prewar not postwar.” One goal was to develop military
strategists, but from the beginning
there were also some who argued that
the purpose was to develop “air statesmen” who could “stand up to the politicos” and gain a “full share in the
formulation of national policies.”
Grandstaff credits the Air War College
with excellent methodology but finds
the value of its educational content
variable. He does not consider how
method, in fact, affects content.
The one important change in U.S. military education since Vietnam has been
the emphasis given to joint education.
This shift was imposed by Congress.
Thomas A. Keany details the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act’s
requirements, noting an assumption that
education on jointness can occur only in
a joint environment and arguing that
emphasis on campaigns diminishes the
attention given to the many other ways
in which the services should be cooperating. Ronald G. Haycock explores another example of civilian intervention,
recounting Canadian changes since its
military’s “Last Traumatic Experience.”
(Canadian troops murdered a Somalian
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teen in 1993.) The National Defense College was closed, officers were required to
get college degrees, the content of their
education was greatly expanded, and the
publication of a new college journal was
ordered. Haycock’s essay on the changes
and their potential should be required
reading as Canada endeavors to find its
way out of the “colonial cringe” through
emphasized tactics and technology.
In his overview of current European
military education, Peter Foot describes
three types that exist today: “Jena”
schools, which look to professional,
in-house education; “Falkland” schools,
which “bolt on” new material; and
“Kosovo” schools, which address complexity and ambiguity and seek external, civilian accreditation. Foot notes a
trend toward commonality, including
more joint and combined training and
advanced distance learning. He gives
particular attention to military training
in Eastern Europe, noting in particular
developments in Bulgaria and in the
Baltic republics’ tristate institution.
In all, this is a collection worth reading, especially to remind us of the impediments to change and the perpetual
tension between training and education (within its critical thinking), between tradition and innovation, and
between technology and strategy. The
debate over military education began
as early as Plato, and it will not end
with Kennedy or Neilson.
JUDITH STIEHM

Florida International University

Hackworth, David H., and Eilys England. Steel My
Soldiers’ Hearts. New York: Simon & Schuster,
2002. 444pp. $27.95
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There are so many books about the
Vietnam War and the Vietnam experience that the message of one more risks
being lost amidst a vast ocean of tragic
tales told with great pain. However,
Hackworth and England have provided
something more than a reminiscence of
an Army combat unit in the post–Tet
Offensive world of Vietnam; they have
presented readers with a tactical reform
primer for infantry. All the information
is there in stark GI English, beginning
with the first sentence of chapter 1 (not
repeated here out of delicacy), and finishing up with the last sentences of the
last chapter: “We now need to fight
smart as much as we need to get even.
There is no other choice. We do it right
or we lose. We win—or we die.”
Hackworth and England are referring
to the new war against terrorism in the
post-9/11 world. The quotation applies
to the current day, and it applied to
Hackworth’s nightmare battalion in the
Mekong Delta in 1969.
His unit was the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The troops making up the
battalion were, as the authors state, citizen draftee soldiers, not the volunteers
that had filled the first combat units
that went into Vietnam back in 1965.
These soldiers did not want to be in
Vietnam. They had come from a country where protests against the war had
become large-scale performance art,
widely publicized by news media and,
most importantly, were supported by a
large portion of the population. These
reluctant warriors were doubly cursed,
for they were part of an army the leadership of which had started to unravel
in the face of the stubborn refusal of an
enemy to admit defeat, an enemy who
still could attack U.S. soldiers with skill,
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